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Nuclear Security Culture and Self- 
Assessment: BATAN’s Experience 
 
 
Anhar R. Antariksawan and Khairul Khairul 






Organizations should increase safety to minimize the harmful effects of nuclear materials. Additionally, 
organizations should take measures to protect security culture within the organization itself. This paper 
covers the National Nuclear Energy Agency of Indonesia’s (BATAN’s) promotion of nuclear security 
culture and self- assessment projects, which is based on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 
(IAEA) methodology. 
 
Keywords: security, security culture, self-assessment 
I. Introduction 
Nuclear reactors that use nuclear materials for research or power generation run the risk of introducing 
nuclear materials to the environment accidentally or maliciously. In order to prevent this, organizations 
that run nuclear reactor operations should establish safety, security, and safeguards. 
 
Those three aspects are: 
 
 Safety- Achieving proper operating conditions, preventing accidents or mitigating consequences 
of accidents, resulting in protection of workers, the public, and the environment from undue 
radiation hazards[1] 
 
 Security- Preventing, detecting, and responding to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal 
transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances, or their 
associated facilities[1] 
 
 Safeguards- Monitoring nuclear materials through nuclear material accounting, containment, and 
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All three of these aspects protect workers, the environment, and the public from any harmful effects of 
nuclear materials. 
 
The National Nuclear Energy Agency of Indonesia (BATAN) operates three research reactors and several 
supporting facilities, including nuclear fuel and radioactive waste treatment facilities. Since those 
facilities involve nuclear materials, BATAN takes safety, security, and safeguards seriously. This paper 
will focus on nuclear security and will describe BATAN’s endeavors to enhance security through 
promoting nuclear security culture and self-assessment of nuclear security culture within BATAN’s 
organization. 
II. Elements of the Security System and the Human 
Factor 
The security system should be put in place in order to achieve a high level of security effectiveness. Five 
basic elements of the security system are:[3] 
  
 Deterrence – A strong defense would prevent would-be attackers 
 Detection –the security system alerts the facility of either covert or overt attacks  
 Delay –the security system prevents the adversary’s progress towards the intended target. A 
successful delay will allow time for a response. 
 Response – the actions taken by security personnel stops the adversary from being successful. 
 Recovery – the ability to resume normal operations after an incident or attempted incident. 
 
In general, the more advanced the security system, the more important its human factor is. Security 
incidents are always connected with people or their activities.. Human behavior is influenced by culture, 
so, it is important that security is effective and continues to be strengthened. In other words, developing 
security culture within an organization is about encouraging the staff to respect common values and 
standards towards security whether they are inside or outside the workplace [4]. In other words, the 
nuclear security culture makes human factors as an assest within nuclear security. 
III. Nuclear Security Culture 
Nuclear security culture has been important to security experts for many years. For example: 
 
 At the June 2000 meeting of the working group of informal open-ended expert meeting to discuss 
whether there is a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
(CPPNM), Meeting stated that due priority should be given to security culture. This has been 
endorsed by IAEA BG and welcomed by IAEA GC 45 (GC(45)RES/14) in 2001. 
 
• Amendment of CPPNM (2005) to include Security Culture (Fundamental Principle F): 
“Security Culture: All organizations involved in implementing physical protection should give 
due priority to the security culture; to its development and maintenance necessary to ensure its 
effective implementation in the entire organization” 
 
• The IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2004) states: 
“Every State should, in order to protect individuals, society, and the environment, take 
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 In March 2005, the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Direction for the 
Future stated: “The fundamental principles of nuclear security include embedding a nuclear 
security culture throughout the organizations involved…”  
 
Finally, in 2008, IAEA published the Nuclear Security Series No. 7 on Nuclear Security Culture. In this 
document, Nuclear Security Culture is defined as:[5] 
 
“The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals, organization and 
institutions which serves as means to support and enhance nuclear security” 
 
Based on the IAEA document on nuclear security culture (see Fig. 1), the model of an effective nuclear 
security culture was developed and derived from a model of organization culture.  This model consists of 
three layers: 
  
1. The first layer is recognition. This is the belief that credible threats exist; therefore, nuclear 
security is important. People should develop and remember this over time. This is not easily 
assessed, but it effects how people respond to security issues and events. 
 
2. The second layer is a set of principles the managers in an organization could instill to guide 
decision and behavior. These principles should be known by staff and applied consistently for 
entire workforces within the organization. 
 
3. The third layer is the management system, which covers the behavior of leaders and personnel. 
This layer can be monitored by assessment of nuclear security culture based on  a set of 
characteristics and indicators. 
 
In order to evaluate nuclear security culture, IAEA has been developing a methodology to conduct a self-
assessment (IAEA-NST026).[6] The methodology is a multi-stage process as shown in Fig. 2. This 
process is started when leadership decides to conduct self-assessment and finishes when the results are 
reported. These results become the foundation for the next assessment. 
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Figure 1. Characteristics of Nuclear Security Culture[5]  
Figure 2. Multi-stage process of self-assessment of nuclear security culture 
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IV. Milestones of Activity for Nuclear Security Culture in 
BATAN 
After IAEA published the NSS No. 7 on nuclear security culture – implementing guide, in 2010 BATAN 
started to promote the nuclear security culture with help of IAEA and the Center for International Trade 
and Security (CITS) at the University of Georgia (UGA) in the United States. The promotion was 
originally led by BATAN and several stakeholders involved in security. A regional workshop was also 
held in BATAN in December 2011. 
 
After a series of promotional activities on nuclear security culture, IAEA proposed BATAN lead a pilot 
project in nuclear security culture; this offer was accepted and the project began in 2012. It was the first 
project of its kind in the world. It was a survey conducted several months after the 2nd Nuclear Security 
Summit was held in Seoul, South Korea, in March 2012 and finished in 2013 with the support of IAEA 
and experts from CITS-UGA. The result of this initial self-assessment was presented at the IAEA 
Technical Meeting and International Conference on Nuclear Security in April 2013. 
 
Based on the results, BATAN established a Center for Security Culture and Assessment (CSCA) on 
September 29, 2014.CSCA’s mission is to promote and foster nuclear security culture in BATAN, 
conduct self-assessment, develop the security culture model, self-assessment methodology, and increase 
collaboration with other institutions dealing with security culture. CSCA became the premiere training 
hub for this regionally, nationally, and internationally along with the IAEA and CITS-UGA. This 
initiative was presented by the Indonesian delegation of the National Progress Report of Indonesia at the 
Nuclear Security Summit 2014 in Hague. In order to continue CSCA’s endeavors in promoting nuclear 
security culture and self-assessment, BATAN decided to conduct second self-assessment in 2015 used 
four tools (survey, interview, document review and observation) to evaluate the progress of the first 
assessment. This second self-assessment is applying the final draft of IAEA self-assessment methodology 
(NST026). 
V. Conduct of Nuclear Security Self-Assessment 
Since 2012, BATAN has conducted two nuclear security self-assessments. The results are summarized in 
Table. 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Self-Assessment Conduct in BATAN with survey statement validation 
  1st Self-assessment 2nd Self-assessment 
Period : August 2012-March 2013  
Method : Three research reactors Multi-purpose reactor, nuclear fuel cycle 
technology and radioactive waste centers 
Team : 41 members with less various scientific 
background 
32 members with various scientific 
background, incl. psychology 
Respondent : 624 surveyed, 128 interviewed 277 surveyed, 43 interviewed 
Others : Without survey statement validation With survey statement validation 
 
Results of the two self-assessments are presented in three categories: weakness, potential weakness, and 
strength. The results from self-assessment are used to improve security culture and the security system 
within BATAN.  
 
From the first self-assessment, 624 surveys were entered into the database and 87 histograms of the 
evaluations were plotted; with more than 500 total pages of data. These histograms generally indicated 
good security culture in adhering to procedures, but some weaknesses were found in the reward system. 
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In addition, the 35 written comments amplified the fact that the reward system was not well understood 
and that rewards in the security area should be emphasized over punishments.[7] The personal interview 
sessions confirmed that in fact the reward system was not well known. In addition, a number of other 
interesting security culture issues surfaced such as: “Standard Operating Procedures on Security are only 
available to security personnel”; “The importance of the use of the badges was not well understood”; 
“The role of non-security personnel in the security function was not well understood”; and “Non-security 
personnel do not generally apply their orientation security training.” The result from this first self-
assessment has been used as the base level of security culture in BATAN to further improve the security 
system. 
 
The second self-assessment is ongoing. The survey and interview portion are complete, but the 
observation and document assessment stages are not.   Preliminary evaluations from the survey and 
interview portion indicate that some weaknesses discovered in the first self-assessment have already 
improved. Security related communication has been improved. For example, staff can easily inform 
leaders about security, safety, and safeguard. However, it appears that some characteristics related to 
leadership behavior need to be improved.  
 
By conducting these two self-assessments, it could be expected that the capability of personnel in the 
nuclear security culture to self-asses is increasing. Accordingly, BATAN is ready to collaborate with 
other institutions on terms of promoting security culture and its self-assessment. 
VI. Conclusion 
Safety, security, and safeguarding are the three most important aspects that need to be strengthened to 
protect workers, the public, and the environment against possible harmful effects of nuclear materials. In 
response to this need, BATAN has been a champion of security culture since 2010. In 2012, BATAN 
conducted a pilot project for personal accountability in nuclear security culture for its three research 
reactors. A second assessment using IAEA methodology began in 2015. The results from these self-
assessments are valuable and have been used to both improve security systems and foster implementation 
of nuclear security culture in BATAN. 
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